Introduction
The endemic nature of corruption in Russia's political economy has long become a common knowledge both inside and outside the country. The societal understanding of corruption issues is constructed, on one hand, by the Russian political opposition that uses official corruption exposure to mobilize political support behind its cause, as best exemplified by Alexey Navalny's investigations.
been fired and arrested on corruption charges.
3 Several of them were already given harsh sentences. 4 Russia's top economic official, Alexey Uliukaev, was dismissed from his post in 2016 and charged with extorting a $2 million bribe from the state oil company Rosneft. 5 In the last few years the law enforcement agencies have been activated across the regions, placing them into a unique position of enhanced influence among the regional actors. 6 The position of the regional governor that used to be the lynchpin of the regional political system seems to have been undermined by the growing relevance and repressive trends associated with the law enforcement agencies and the control over the regional cadres exercised by the Kremlin.
The high political salience of corruption in Russia is not accidental. It reflects the degree to which it has permeated the economic and social life of Russian citizens -whether of those engaged in business, who might be trying to get through all the common obstacles to doing business in Russia, or those who might be encountering it in their everyday life.
According to recent studies, 35% of Russian entrepreneurs had to give bribes or gifts to state officials; furthermore, half of all the business actors were involved in some type of corruption schemes. 7 Public procurement system in Russia is one of the sites where 3 Aleksandr Khoroshavin (Sakhalin), Nikita Belykh (Kirov), Vyacheslav Gaiser (Komi), Aleksandr Solovyev (Udmirtia), and Leonid Markelov (Mari-El).
4 Nikita Belykh was sentenced for 8 years in prison; Aleksandr Khoroshavin was sentenced for 13 years.
5 "Russian Economy Minister Ulyukayev charged with $2m bribe," BBC news, November 15, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37983744 (accessed March 30, 2018).
6 Regional governors have indeed commented on the importance of establishing working relationships with the law enforcement agencies in the regions. It is evident that these regional branches of federal agencies have acquired an additional clout as a result of the anti-corruption campaign.
corruption is still very common despite the reforms undertaken in [2005] [2006] . 8 The
Russian judicial system, law enforcement, tax and custom administration also present the economic actors with high corruption risk (Russia Corruption Report). 9 Bribes are common in Russian citizens' everyday life as well. Russia's healthcare and education system as well as the spheres of science and culture have also been named among the most corrupt spheres in Russia.
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The rich literature and expanding research on corruption notwithstanding, there are still big gaps in our knowledge both about actual corrupt practices as well as the sources and determinants of corruption perceptions in Russia. 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
This study is motivated by the idea that understanding corruption perceptions in Russia has to take into account the insider view of corruption and be based on comprehending the nature of the system economic actors operate in. If it is true that corruption is the main mode of operation and, indeed, the very raison d'etre for the system's maintenance, then it is hard to expect that perceptions reflect the reality of corruption and that changes In this study I rely on theory of 'patronal presidentialism' that allows for the systematic exploration of the effects of such particular institutional environment on the actions and perceptions of political and economic actors embedded in it. 27 Hale's original theory was developed to explain regime cycles in the post-Soviet region but its applicability goes beyond the issue of political regime dynamics. This approach views the institutional environment (such as that of Russia) as characterized by the dominance and the 'takenfor-granted' nature of informal exchanges between social, political and economic actors.
Formal institutions and procedures in such systems matter to the extent that they shape actors' expectations about who is in charge. Those on the top of the formal power pyramid (such as presidents) combine formal and informal power mechanisms and resources and become the ultimate source of authority within their jurisdictions. Periods of uncertainty ensue at the moments when such authority figure faces a potential power transition -either due to upcoming elections, aging or illness issues that can affect the expectations of major players in relation to the likely successor. Given that access to power resources and economic wealth are highly intertwined in such systems the stakes involved in power transition are extremely high. Therefore, the prospects for political change cause increased inter-elite conflict and competition as different groups jockey for influence and for an increase of their chances to shape the outcomes of power transition. This assumption is true in many cases when governors' troubles are frequently publicly discussed in the media, especially when the governor is involved in public scandals and elite conflicts. 34 At the same time, it might not accurately reflect the situation in the regions where gubernatorial change occurs abruptly. 35 The second measure of expected All models include control variables of firm age, size, sector, ownership, gross regional product (GRP) composition (construction, retail and extractive sectors as a percentage of GRP); log of regional GRP; population density; and regional shares of state-owned and privately owned enterprises. These controls were selected based on earlier studies that have demonstrated these factors to be associated with firms' perceptions of business environment. 37 Additionally, I include controls for the insider-outsider status of governors following the findings in a study of regional business environment in Russia that regional actors have a strong preference for insider governors.
38
Results
All the results are aggregated in three tables with Table 1 sales paid as bribes is likely to be problematic and not reflect realities with corruption.
The propensity for honest reporting on the actual share of bribes would differ dramatically across the regions and, in all likelihood, follow different rationales for such divergences. In some regions there might be an accepted norm of bribe-taking by some state agencies and the firms might report on that; in other regions (more politically stable and integrated) bribes might not play an important role because the economic sphere is dominated by firms closely connected to government officials and, thus, be protected by
them. Yet another scenario is that firms in regions with more active and recent anticorruption activities might be afraid to report these numbers to start with, denying that bribery plays an important role.
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It is also important to pay attention to the temporal dynamics of regional corruption that might or might not produce a shift in perceptions of corruption. Frequency of informal payments to get things done -0.225** (0.088) Note: ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1 Informal payments to parliamentarians have direct impact 
Frequency of informal payments to courts

